Introduction
This chapter discusses the syntactic and semantic relations between thè head of a phrase' and the phrase itself.
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In particular, the phrase is à kind of' the head since the latter provides both the semantic and syntactic type of the phrase (Hudson, 1987: 115{6) . For example, the noun can be treated as head in noun phrases and its systematic priority over other categories in the phrase, such as adjectives and determiners, is manifest in the syntactic and semantic type of the phrase. There are three reasons for discussing these syntactic and semantic relations. The rst is to introduce a uni cation framework which characterizes them in terms of a dependency approach to combination: categories in a binary phrase are combined as`head' and`modi er ' (or`dependent') (Hays, 1964; Anderson, 1977: 92{100; Hudson, 1984: 75{9; Miller, 1985: 25{31) . The second reason is to show that this framework provides a better account of these relations than frameworks where categories are combined as functor and argument (Ajdukiewicz, 1935; Vennemann and Harlow, 1977; Flynn, 1983; Calder et al., 1987; Zeevat, 1988) . The third | and most 1 My thanks to participants at the Talking Heads Round Table for comments on an earlier draft of this chapter, especially my co-editors. The work was supported in part by the Commission of the European Communities under project P2218 (SUNDIAL).
2 See Radford (this volume) for an alternative treatment.
important | reason is to introduce evidence which demonstrates that the semantic relations between heads and phrases are not necessarily transparent: the phrase can exhibit semantic properties which con ict with those of the head. This evidence leads to a revision of the framework where semantic con icts are resolved on the basis of the head modi er distinction.
The Head Modi er Principle
The framework adopted is a uni cation grammar in which categories combine as head and modi er to yield a result category for the phrase. Before describing the framework in detail, we outline three aspects of dependency grammar which motivate it: speci cation, category constancy and obligatoriness. The rst aspect is that the modi er category syntactically and semantically speci es the head category. As Jesperson (1924: 96) says`the chief word head] is de ned (quali ed, modi ed) by another word, which may be de ned (quali ed, modi ed) by a third word'. With large elephants, for example, the noun elephants is semantically speci ed by the adjective large: the size of the elephants is speci ed as large. The modi er may also specify syntactic properties of the head; in two elephants the quanti er two conrms the plural number on the head elephants. These examples illustrate two e ects of speci cation on the head: the addition of new properties; and con rmation of existing properties. 3 The second aspect is category constancy: the syntactic and semantic type of the result category is provided by the head rather than the modi er category (Hjelmslev, 1939) . With pink elephants, for example, the result category is syntactically a`kind of' noun, not an adjective, and semantically a`kind of' entity rather than a property of an entity.
The third aspect is obligatoriness: the head category is obligatory to the phrase (Hjelmslev, 1939; Miller, 1985: 27; Anderson, 1986: 55) . The notion of obligatoriness, however, must be approached with caution since the absence of a category can indicate either optional or elliptical status (Zwicky, 1985: 13) . Head categories are obligatory since they provide the syntactic and semantic types of the result category; without these, the result category would not be de ned. Consequently, when the head category is absent, it must be elliptical rather than optional: it is implicit in the discourse and when re-constructed from context provides the syntactic and semantic types of the phrase (Matthews, 1981: 38{45) . For example, in the context of talking about two lms, the head noun ( lm) can be elided as in I didn't see either (Nichols, this volume) . Modi er categories, on the other hand, are not obligatory in this sense. In phrases where they are obligatory, it is the head category which provides the types; for example, the result category in the auxiliary-verb phrase the elephant may like hay is semantically a`liking' event not a property such as possibility. 4 Modi er categories are obligatory in such constructions in order to provide properties necessary for the result category, properties which are not provided by the head itself. For example, the result of combining a verb with an auxiliary verb must be speci ed for tense and if this is not inherent in the verb (like), then it must be provided by the auxiliary verb modi er (may).
These three aspects underpin combination: phrases are characterized as the category which results from the extension of a head category through speci cation by a modi er category. The head category provides the syntactic and semantic type of the result category so long as the modi er cat-egory does not changes properties of the head which de ne its syntactic or semantic type.
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The head category is also obligatory since it is necessary for speci cation by the modi er category and for the existence of the result category.
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In this framework, each category is de ned for the attribute value pairs given in (1) (Andry et al., forthcoming): 7 (1) category = phonology^syntax^order^semantics^constraints phonology = member-of(orthographic form) syntax = head^modi er head = type type = noun _ verb _ adjective _ auxiliary _ determiner _ adverb modi er = set-of(category) order = directionality^adjacency^optionality directionality = pre _ post adjacency = next _ nonnext optionality = optional _ obligatory semantics = type^set-of(property) type = member-of(type hierarchy) constraints = set-of(constraint) constraint = name^type^condition^arg name = member-of(constraint-name) type = necessary _ default condition = path _ constraint arg = path _ constraint
Combination is characterized in terms of the uni cation of part of the head category with the whole of the modi er category, as well as constraints which relate this part to other parts of the head category (Shieber, 1986: 5 This limit on speci cation is one way in which head categories have priority over modi er categories: category constancy, a combinatorial e ect associated with head categories, has priority over speci cation, a combinatorial e ect associated with modi er categories. 6 Since head categories are lexical categories and result categories are identical to head categories after extension, result categories are merely extended lexical categories. The head modi er relation is treated as a basic relation between lexical categories, and constituency as a derived relation (Anderson and Durand, 1986: 2) . 7 For expository convenience, the value of the phonology attribute is simply an orthographic form and the syntactic head property is only de ned for syntactic type | morpho-syntactic properties, such as person, number and case, can be de ned by analogy with`order' properties.
14{24; Pollard and Sag, 1987: 28{50) . Unifying categories composed of attribute-value pairs imposes two restrictions on speci cation: compatibility and subsumption. With compatibility, only categories with compatible attribute value pairs can unify. With subsumption, all attribute value pairs in each unifying category must be contained in their uni cation: information cannot be lost or changed, only con rmed or added. In this way, uni cation supports the two e ects of speci cation described above.
The syntax attribute of categories is broadly analagous with that in Categorial Grammar (see Section 3). In particular, the head modi er distinction has been`pushed' inside the syntax attribute so that each category is de ned for a head attribute, here describing its syntactic type, and a modi er attribute whose value is a set of categories with which it can combine. Combinatorial information in dependency rules is speci ed in the categories themselves, thereby reducing both the number and complexity of rules. For example, the rule for intransitive verbs, V (N *) (Robinson, 1970: 262) , is characterized using a general combinatorial rule | the Head Modi er Principle (hmp) | together with the category structure in (2) where the value of <syntax head type> is verb and the value of <syntax modi er rst syntax head type> is noun. Note that the relative ordering and optionality of these categories is speci ed in the value of the modi er's order attribute: the noun is obligatory 8 Paths, such as <syntax modi er rst syntax head type>, identify substructures within the category. The set values have been given an arbitrary ordering to faciliate identi cation; rst in a path identi es the rst category in an ordered set.
(obligatory) and precedes the verb (pre), although they are not necessarily adjacent since no value is speci ed for the attribute adjacency. A concept is described in terms of the semantics attribute of a category through its type attribute and a set of properties. The type identi es the location of the concept in an inheritance hierarchy. Types are ordered in terms of subsumption such that more general types subsume more speci c types and, conversely, types which are subsumed by more general types inherit properties from them. Apart from the root of the hierarchy, which de nes mode properties, each type is de ned for either atomic or complex core properties: atomic properties are characterized with a value attribute; and complex properties are characterized with one or more role attributes, where each role expresses a relation between the concept itself and another concept in the hierarchy. In the hierarchy shown in Figure 1 , the root type top is de ned for mode properties, such as polarity and de nite, whose values are themselves of the type pre-property. The top type subsumes four general types of concept which in turn inherit the mode properties: event, entity, property and pre-property.
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The type event, for example, is de ned for a core property, theme, which relates it to concepts of the type entity. This property is inherited by the type run which is also de ned for the roles source and goal. Likewise, entity is de ned for the role colour, which relates it to concepts of the type colour-property, itself subsumed by the type property, and this property is inherited by subsumed types such as elephant.
Finally, each category is de ned for a set of constraints which explicitly relate sub-structures within the category. The name of the constraint spe- 9 The motivation for dividing mode and core properties of concepts derives from the process of`anchoring' concepts in a discourse model where core, but not mode, properties can form part of the model | mode properties merely guide the anchoring process.
10 These types are, in part, derived from work in formal semantics, especially within Situation Semantics (Barwise and Perry, 1983; Fenstad et al., 1987 Figure 1 : A portion of a concept hierarchy ci es the relation between the arguments in the constraint. For example, an equality constraint speci es a re-entrancy relationship between path arguments. The type of a constraint indicates whether the relation is necessary or a default; while default relations may hold, necesary relations must hold for the category to be well-formed. Conditions indicate that the relation is conditional; necessary constraints must hold if the condition is satis ed; default relations may hold if the condition is satis ed.
One purpose of constraints is to de ne the relation between the modi er attribute of a category and its head attribute.
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The e ect of this is to pass information from a modi er category, which uni es with an active modi er in the modi er set, up to the head attribute of the head category, which then becomes the result category for the phrase. For example, a constraint may de ne a re-entrancy relation between the semantics of a modi er category and a role in semantics of the head category. In (3), the semantics of the`subject' of run is equated with the value of the theme role by means of an equality constraint which uni es the value of <syntax modi er rst semantics> with that of <semantics theme>: Accordingly, when run combines with a noun in the subject position, such as elephants in elephants run, the subject's semantic type and properties are equated with those of the theme: the semantic type of theme in (3), for example, subsumes the semantic type of elephants in (6) below. While the semantic constraint in (3) is appropriate for complement modi ers, it is inappropriate for attribute modi ers since these modi ers can be iterated and on each iteration a di erent attribute modi ed. Attribute modi ers can be divided into two types: mode modi ers, such as determiners, auxiliaries and intensive adverbs, which modify mode properties of the head and are subsumed by the general semantic type pre-property; and core modi ers, such as adjectives and adverbs, which modify its core properties and are subsumed by the type property. Consider the categories for the, pink and elephants given in (4), (5) and (6) The category for elephants given in (6), speci es an equality relation where the paths include typed variables: NUMBER in path1 varies over the set of modi ers; and ROLE in path2 varies over the roles in its semantics. When the mode modi er the in (4) combines with this category, it uni es with the rst active modi er (definite is subsumed by pre-property) and application of the constraint then equates its semantics with the de nite role contained in the head category's semantics attribute. Likewise, the core modi er pink in (5) uni es with the second active modi er (colour-property is subsumed by property) and the constraint equates its semantics with the colour property in the head's semantics. The semantics of the result category is shown in (7): (7) semantics : Since this constraint does not specify which role the modi er's semantics is to be equated with, di erent occurrences of attribute modi ers can be equated with di erent roles in the head. The only restriction is that the structures must be compatible; this rules out phrases like black pink elephants where incompatible colour properties are speci ed. Furthermore, the only di erence between the constraints for complement and attribute modiers is that in the former case both the ROLE and NUMBER are speci ed. The head modi er assignments in this framework are based upon traditional assignments (Chomsky, 1970: 210; Jackendo , 1977b; Gazdar and Pullum, 1981) . Table 1 is the general semantic type of the combining categories. Within the dependency tradition, the priority of heads has been motivated on the basis of ranking; for example, in dependency case grammar categories are ranked on the basis of a syntactic type constructed out of semantic properties, such as N | potentially referential | and P | potentially predicative (Anderson, 1989b ). An alternative to Anderson's approach is to rank categories directly on the basis of their general semantic type as shown below ( signi es outranking):
(8) event entity property pre-property
Since is a transitive relation, this ranking underpins the priority of heads over modi ers and is systematically re ected in the assignments in Table 1 . In sum, this framework o ers a combinatorial approach to heads, informed by both the dependency and uni cation traditions. This approach is summarized in the Head Modi er Principle in (9): (9) Head Modi er Principle (hmp) i. Categories in a binary construction combine as head C H and modi er C M to yield a result category C R . ii. C R = C H after speci cation of C H by C M and application of a category constraint within C H . iii. Speci cation: C H is speci ed by C M i there exists a C such that C 2 C H :<syntax modi er> and C t C M .
iv. Category constraint: C H :<syntax modi er NUM-BER semantics> t C H :<semantics ROLE> where NUMBER ranges over the set of modi ers and ROLE over semantic role attributes de ned for C H :<semantics type>.
v. The distinction between head and modi er categories is based upon the ordering of general semantic types in (8).
The Functor Argument Principle
The Functor Argument Principle (fap) is based upon a distinction between functor and argument categories: the functor category speci es the argument of a function (the`take' category) as well as the result of the function (the`make' category). Accordingly, the prioritized category in a phrase is identi ed as the functor category, as opposed to the head category. Identifying which category in a phrase is the functor and which is the argument, however, is not a straightforward task. As Zwicky (1985: 4) observed, either category can, in principle, be assigned the status of functor with sufcient ingenuity. For this reason, we pay particular attention to Keenan's observations on the correlation between surface form and logical form.
Keenan claims that the directionality of agreement relations between expressions is systematically based upon the directionality of semantic variation. This is captured in the following principle:
Meaning-Form Dependency Principle (MFDP) Given A and B distinct constituents of a syntactic structure E, A may agree with B i the semantic interpretation of expressions of A varies with the semantic interpretation of expressions of B in the interpretation of E. (Keenan, 1979: 168) Pursuing the question of whether`there is] any correlation between what varies in meaning with what and the logical structures assigned to agreement pairs' (Keenan, 1979: 170) , Keenan develops a second principle:
The Functional Dependency Principle (FDP) Given A and B distinct constituents of a SF surface form] E, A may agree with B i in the LF logical form] of expressions of E, the LFs of expressions of A are interpreted as functions taking the interpretations of expressions of B as arguments. (Keenan, 1979: 172) Taking these principles together, one interpretation of Keenan's position is that semantic variation is a characteristic of functor categories but not argument categories: i.e. the semantic interpretation of functor categories varies with that of argument categories, but not vice versa. For example, Keenan argues that the interpretation of a transitive verb varies with the interpretation of its direct object as he shows for cut:
(10) a. cut nger (`to make an incision on the surface of') b. cut cake (`to cut all the way through';`to divide into portions for the purpose of serving') c. cut lawn (`trim') d. cut heroin (`diminish the potency of by adding a physically comparable substance') Likewise, in noun phrases the interpretation of adjectives, such as at, varies with the interpretation of nouns as shown in (11): (11) a. at beer (`lacking normal taste') b. at road (`without bumps or depressions') c. at voice (`too low in pitch') On the basis of semantic variation then, verbs can be treated as functors with nouns as their arguments and adjectives as functors with noun arguments. This approach can be captured in the Functor Argument Principle:
(12) Functor Argument Principle (fap)
i. Categories in a binary construction combine as functor C F and argument C A to yield a result category C R . ii. C R = C F after a uni cation U and application of a function F.
iii. U: C F :C take t C A .
iv. F: C F speci es a function F which maps between C F :C take and C F :C make .
v. The distinction between functor and argument categories is based upon semantic variation as described in the mfdp and the fdp above.
The assignments arising from the fap, broadly in accord with Keenan (1979) , are given in Table 2.   12 Comparison with the assignments in Table 1 phrase functor argument noun-verb verbjnoun noun verb-noun verbjnoun noun adjective-noun nounjnoun noun verb-adverb (verbjnoun)j(verbjnoun) verbjnoun determiner-noun nounjnoun noun auxiliary-verb (verbjnoun)j(verbjnoun) verbjnoun adverb-adjective (nounjnoun)j(nounjnoun) nounjnoun Table 2 : Assignments with fap demonstrates that the fap and hmp assign priority to di erent expressions in some of these phrase types. In particular, functor categories di er from head categories in adjective-noun, verb-adverb, determiner-noun, auxiliaryverb and adverb-adjective phrases. Even if the correlation between the functor argument distinction and the head modi er distinction were inverted so that argument categories were correlated with head categories, the problem would still persist: arguments do not correspond to heads in nounverb and verb-noun phrases. However, a relation can be established between these assignments through an additional principle | the Endotypic Principle (Vennemann and Harlow, 1977; Bouma, 1988) . The Endotypic Principle is based upon the distinction between endotypic and exotypic functors. An endotypic functor is a functor of the form XjX:
i.e. its take and make categories are identical. As a corollary, exotypic functors are functors of the form XjY .
The Endotypic Principle (ep) 12 With auxiliary-verb, verb-adverb and adverb-adjective phrases, no assignments are given in Keenan (1979) . With the rst and second phrases, we have assumed the analyses given in contemporary categorial grammars such as ucg (Calder et al., 1987: 18{35) . With the third construction, the assignment is taken from Hawkins (1984: 113{14) . In addition, the direction of combination is ignored: \j" covers both forward and backward combination.
In a construction consisting of a functor F and an argument A, F is the head, unless it is endotypic in which case A is the head.
A functor which is not a head is a speci er (attribute) An argument which is not a head is a speci er (complement)
Of the functors given in Table 2 , only verbs in verb-noun and noun-verb phrases are exotypic: as functors they correspond to heads with their arguments as (complement) speci ers. The remaining functors are endotypic. For example, in adjective-noun phrases the adjective is a functor which, syntactically, takes a category of the type noun and makes a category of the type noun (nounjnoun) and semantically it speci es a function mapping from the set of entities into the set of entities (<e>j<e>). And similarly in verb-adverb phrases, the adverb is a functor which takes a syntactic category of the type verbjnoun (i.e. a verb category which itself takes a noun category) and makes a category of the same type.
With the Endotypic Principle then, the head modi er distinction can be derived from the functor argument distinction. The problem for the fap, however, is that generalizations in serialization and category constancy are couched in terms of the head modi er distinction not the more`basic' functor argument distinction. In addition, the allegedly distinctive semantic characteristic of functors | semantic variation | is not supported.
Serialization
Greenberg's implicational serialization universals captured cross-language statistical regularities in the linear order of categories within phrases (Greenberg, 1966) . For example, if in a language, such as Japanese, the direct object precedes the verb, then, typically, the adjective will precede the noun and the noun the adposition. Such apparent regularities can be accounted for in a systematic manner with the following principle based upon the head modi er distinction (Anderson, 1979: 7) :
Head Modi er Serialization Principle Serialization in a phrase tends to follow systematically from the relation between heads and modi ers: either modi ers precede heads or heads precede modi ers. Hawkins (1984) provides further support for the hmp in relation to language type frequency.
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He formulates a principle which predicts the relative number of language types on the basis of serialization of heads and modi ers within phrases (Hawkins, 1984: 130-1):
Cross Category Harmony Principle The more similar the cross-category positioning of head, the more languages; the less similar, the fewer languages.
In both cases then, the hmp in conjunction with serialization principles appear to provide a straightforward account of word order generalizations. However, as Dryer (1988) has shown, there are other factors at play in determining serialization. These include dominance and harmony principles, areal in uence, as well as the direction of branching in branching as opposed to non-branching constructions. One e ect of this is that serialization principles based upon the head modi er distinction cannot be seen in isolation from other principles: serialization is determined by the interaction of a number of ordering principles and cannot be reduced to a single universal principle. Principles such as those above, then, do not provide a complete account of serialization: they simply provide a category-based restriction on serialization.
Accounts based upon the fap, however, require an additional principle to provide restrictions on serialization. Keenan (1979) employs a principle similar to, but more constrained than, the Endotypic Principle:
The Dissimulation Principle (dp) Functional expressions taking dnps determined noun phrases] as arguments and functional expressions taking cnps common noun phrases] as arguments tend to serialize on the opposite side of their argument expressions. (Keenan, 1979: 188) As Hawkins (1984) points out, while the dp may account for serialization concerning noun phrases, it needs to be extended to account for additional serialization facts such as the correlation between adverb-adjective and adjective-noun serialization (Hawkins, 1984: 113{14) . Vennemann, on the other hand, appeals to the Endotypic Principle and is able to provide a general account of serialization in terms of functors and arguments (Vennemann, 1976; Vennemann and Harlow, 1977; Vennemann, 1984) . Such an account, however, relies upon a derived distinction { that between heads and speci ers { and it is the latter distinction which captures category restrictions on serialization. On the grounds of descriptive economy, the hmp provides a better account since it is the head modi er (or speci er) distinction which underlies these restrictions.
Semantic category constancy
The fap also requires the Endotypic Principle to account for the`kind of' relationship. For neither the functor nor the modi er consistently provides the semantic type of the result category. In phrases with exotypic functors, the functor provides the semantic type. For example, in elephants run, the functor run is, semantically, a function from entities to truth values, a function which can be assigned the type event. The argument restricts the domain of this function to entities of the type elephant. The resulting type is a more speci c event: i.e. the event of elephants running. In phrases with endotypic functors, it is the argument which provides the type of the result category. For example, in adjective-noun phrases like pink elephants, the functor describes a mapping from the set of entities onto the set of entities with the property pink (<e>j<e>), but the argument provides the type of the set, i.e. elephant. While functor provides a restriction on the type of the set of entities, i.e. entities with the property pink, it is the argument which provides the type itself | entities of the type elephant with the colour property pink. Consequently, the Endotypic Principle is required for a systematic account: heads, qua exotypic functors or arguments of endotypic functors, consistently provide the semantic type of the result category.
Semantic variation
According to the fap, one of the distinctive characteristics of functors is that their semantic interpretation varies with their arguments, but not vice versa. This systematic asymmetry, however, is unsupported: variation in semantic interpretation is not simply uni-directional. For just as the argument can a ect the interpretation of the functor, so the functor can a ect the interpretation of the argument.
Consider, for example, the interpretation of verbs and adjectives. As functors, their interpretation can vary with the interpretation of their noun arguments as illustrated in (10) and (11). Psycho-linguistic evidence supports not only variation in this direction, but also in the opposite direction. Murphy (1988) found that the interpretation of adjectives can systematically vary with the interpretation of nouns (see also Cruse, 1986: 152) . For example, long has the interpretation`great length', or a simple elaboration of this, in combination with word and life, but substantially di erent interpretations in combinations with nouns like hand (`expressed in complete sentences and without abbreviations'), eye (`towards the future') and year (`seeming to pass slowly'). Moreover, he also found that the interpretation of nouns varied with that of adjectives (see also Lako , 1987: 83{4) . In some cases, the interpretation highlighted di erent senses of noun; hand, for example, took on interpretations which varied from`side' as in right hand to`anatomical hand' in bleeding hand. In others, variation highlighted di erent aspects of the same sense. Anderson and Ortony (1975) report similar bi-directional variation in the interpretation of nouns and verbs. For example, the nouns steak and soup lead to di erent interpretations of eat: the act of eating is associated with di erent utensils as well as actions of the lips, teeth and tongue. Conversely, the interpretation of piano can vary in di erent verb contexts:
(13) Pianos can be pleasing to listen to. (14) Pianos can be di cult to move.
In (13) the sound, but not the weight, of the piano is relevant, whereas in (14) the opposite is true. As Anderson and Ortony put it`in one context piano is a member of the same category as, say, harmonica, while in another it is certainly not. In the latter case, perhaps sofa would be a cohyponym ' (1975: 169) .
In sum, not only does the fap require the Endotypic Principle to yield analyses which accord with serialization and semantic constancy requirements, but this evidence suggests semantic variation cannot distinguish functors from arguments. The hmp, on the other hand, provides a distinction which can directly account for these requirements and, since combination is based upon uni cation, an inherently bi-directional process, it can, in principle, account for this type of semantic variation. However, as Section 4 demonstrates, there is a clear limit on the range of semantic variation which can be characterized through a simple uni cation approach.
Defeasibility
Defeasibility is a linguistic phenomenon which challenges simple uni cationbased approaches to category combination. The phenomenon is manifest in phrases where there is a con ict, usually a semantic con ict, between properties of the combining categories. The con ict is systematically resolved through the`defeat' of one category by the other: the result category no longer has the property of the`defeated' category since the property is replaced by one appropriate to the`defeated' category. Defeasibility undermines two requirements central to the uni cation framework described in Section 2: only compatible categories can combine; and their uni cation is subsumed by each category | there is no loss or change of information. While the framework needs to be extended to accommodate these challenges, the resolution of con ict seems to support its combinatorial principle.
Four types of semantic defeasibility will be brie y described: typicality defeat, intrinsic defeat, sortal defeat and general defeat. In these types, defeat can vary along a number of dimensions. One of these is dependence upon lexical semantics: i.e. whether or not the occurrence of defeat is dependent upon speci c semantics properties of the defeated category. Another is the nature of the defeated property. Possible properties of a concept can be classi ed as necessary properties or default properties (Murphy, 1988) . Necessary properties are those which are essential for the concept to be categorized as it is; for example, colour is a necessary property of entity. Default properties are`typical' properties of the concept: i.e. unless speci ed to the contrary, concepts will have these properties. For example, four-legged is a default property of elephant unless, of course, they are disabled in the appropriate way. While necessary properties tend to play the major role in determining the application of concepts, default properties, especially perceptual properties like shape, play the major role in identifying instances of a concept. Finally, properties can be related to each other and these relationships can in turn a ect defeat. For example, given a correlation between the sweetness of food and its calori c-value | the sweeter food is, the more calories it typically contains | defeat of the sweetness property will also a ect calori c-value such that we can no longer infer that it has a high value (Franks et al., 1988) .
Typicality defeat
The rst type of defeat, typicality defeat, a ects default properties and is lexically dependent. In an adjective-noun phrase like grey elephants, the value of the colour property speci ed by the modi er category is compatible with the default value grey of elephants. With pink elephants, however, the properties are incompatible and the default value speci ed by the head is defeated by the necessary value speci ed in the modi er category: while elephants are grey, pink elephants are pink. Psycholinguistic experiments also suggest that con icts over default properties are systematically resolved in favour of the modi er category. When the properties of concepts such as games and sports are rated for typicality, the (indirect) modi er games consistently plays a greater role in determining the typicality rating of properties in sports that are also games than the head sports (Hampton, 1987) .
Intrinsic defeat
With the second type, intrinsic defeat, the properties of the semantic type of the defeated category are overridden independently of its lexical semantics. In noun phrases with privative adjectives such as fake, former and false, the adjective modi er consistently defeats the existence of the semantic type of the noun (Kamp, 1975) ; for example, while the concept underlying Renoirs asserts the existence of paintings by Renoir, fake Renoirs denies their existence. Likewise, modi ers of verbs such as never and not undermine the existence of a state or event; in John never crossed the road, there is a denial that a`crossing' event took place. With this type of defeat then, there is a con ict between the value of a mode property of the categories which is resolved in favour of the modi er category; for example, with fake elephants the modi er's value negative for polarity defeats the head's value positive. This makes problematic the subsumption relation between head and result categories: while pink elephants are clearly a`kind of' elephants, false beards are not obviously`kinds of' beards. In particular, the result category no longer contains necessary semantic properties of the head category; false beards, for example, do not grown on chins. Many of their default properties, especially those which play a diagnostic role, are preserved in the result category; with fake Renoir, for example, a su cient number of diagnostic properties must be preserved so as to maintain the contrast with fake Picasso | a fake Renoir must at least appear more like a real Renoir than a fake Picasso.
Sortal Defeat
The third type of defeat, sortal defeat, is similar to intrinsic defeat in that the subsumption relationship between the head and result category is undermined through the loss of necessary semantic properties of the head category, a loss which stems from the defeat of the head by the modi er (Franks et al., 1988; Franks, 1989) . It di ers from intrinsic defeat in three ways.
Firstly, the semantics of the head category is defeated as a consequence of the defeat of a core property. For example, in chocolate elephants the value of the material property chocolate of the adjective modi er defeats the esh of the noun head. Since this property is necessary for the concept, its defeat entails that the subsumption relationship is no longer transparent | chocolate elephants are not real elephants. It does, however, retain default properties such as`elephant shape' which di erentiate chocolate elephants from chocolate mice. Furthermore, one of the concepts is elaborated as a result of defeat: chocolate elephants contains the default values sweet and brown which are not part of either concept but emerge from the elaboration of the modi er concept. Gentner (1981) provides psycholinguistic evidence to demonstrate that a noun modi er can defeat a verb head in a similar manner. For example, when subjects paraphrased sentences such as the lizards worshipped, they tended to produce paraphrases such as`the small grey reptile lay on the hot rock and stared unblinkingly at the sun' (Gentner, 1981: 165) . Here there is a con ict between the value of the agent role in the semantics of the verb head and the modi er's semantics: sentient is incompatible with lizard. Rather than simply replace the type of agent with lizard, the head concept is`elaborated' into the type animate.
A second di erence is that sortal defeat is lexically dependent. For example, stone is a modi er capable of giving rise to sortal defeat. In stone bridge, however, there is no defeat since the material properties speci ed in each category are compatible.
The third di erence is that the discourse situation may play a greater role in determining which category has priority rather than the head modi er distinction. 14 For example, if the sun ower kissed the wall were said in the context of a fancy-dress party, the most likely interpretation would be a metaphorical one in which semantic properties of the noun modi er were defeated: it would describe a person dressed as a sun ower rather than a real ower.
General defeat
The fourth type of defeat, general defeat, o ers the strongest violation of compatibility and subsumption. The result category has neither the general semantic or syntactic type of the head category. With other sorts of defeat, only the semantic type is undermined, and undermined to a limited extent. For example, with sortal defeat in chocolate elephants, while the semantic type of the head is undermined through loss of necessary properties, the result category clearly preserves its general semantic type (entity) as well as the syntactic type (noun) of the head elephants.
Denominal verbs illustrate general defeat (Clark, 1983) . In (15) porch is a noun with the general semantic type entity.
(15) Newspaper boys put the newspapers in the porch.
In (16), however, the result category is a verb with the general semantic type event.
(16) Newspaper boys porch the newspapers.
This change in syntactic type and type can be seen as a manifestation of general defeat. In (16), the categories for porch, the newspaper boys and the papers are unable to combine since none can act as a head category. They can combine, however, if porch is selected as the head category and its syntactic and semantic types are systematically changed in order to accommodate the requirements of the modi er categories.
Signi cance of defeat
These types of semantic defeasibility demonstrate that categories with incompatible properties can combine sucessfully, although not all properties of the`defeated' category are preserved in the result category. With typicality defeat, a default value in the`defeated' category is overridden by a necessary value speci ed in the`defeating' category and the default value is not preserved in the result category. With intrinsic defeat, the necessary value of a mode property in the`defeated' category is overridden by a necessary value in the`defeating' category and, as a result, necessary core properties are lost. With sortal defeat, the value of a necessary core property in the`defeated' category is overridden by a necessary value in the`defeating' category. And with general defeat, the semantic and syntactic types are replaced with those required by the`defeating' category. As a consequence, the subsumption relationship between the`defeated' category and the result category cannot be maintained: successful combination may involve the loss of information.
Two aspects of defeasibility, however, reinforce the hmp (rather than the fap). The rst is that modi ers, in general, have systematic priority in defeat: where there is a con ict, the modi er category is the`defeating' category and the head the`defeated' category. For the utility of the semantic type ranking given in (8) is that manifestations of priority either systematically follow from the ranking or go against it. With defeasibility, priority systematically goes against ranking: categories with semantic types of a lower rank can override properties of those with higher types.
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The second aspect is that when defeat occurs, the head category still provides the basis for the result category. As Gentner says of noun-verb combinations:
The verb meanings were not simply ignored. Other evidence from this study indicates that the verb preserved as much of its meaning as possible : : : given an incompatible noun, the verb was typically extended until it t. (Gentner, 1981: 165{6) Since the hmp identi es the result category as the head category after combination with the modi er category, it is the nature of combination which is in need of revision.
The Head Modi er Principle revisited
With the de nition of the hmp in (9) in Section 2, combination will fail in phrases which manifest defeasibility. In particular, the category constraint (9 iv) will fail in phrases such as the lizards worshipped on account of semantic type incompatibility. Furthermore, if the concept representations are augmented to specify values for mode properties and to specify necessary and default values for core and mode properties, then the category constraint will also fail with pink elephants, fake elephants and chocolate elephants due to incompatibility between semantic properties of the categories. Most aspects of this combination principle, however, can be maintained through a more sophisticated approach to semantic representation, an approach in which constraints dynamically assign necessary and default properties to a concept, and property assignment is regulated by an assignment principle.
These constraints are informed by a theory-based approach to concept structure (Fillmore, 1982; Murphy and Medin, 1985; Lako , 1987) . Theories are seen as`commonsense' or`folk' descriptions of the world:
Representations of concepts are best thought of as theoretical knowledge or, at least, as embedded in knowledge that embodies a theory about the world. (Murphy and Medin, 1985: 298) Their utility lies in determining both the internal and external structure of concepts. In particular, theories underlie the organization of the concepts, such as the hierarchy in Figure 1 , the assignment of necessary and default properties to individual concepts as well as relations, especially explanatory and causal relations, between concepts. For example, Cohen and Murphy (1984) argue that our interpretation of compound concepts such as engine repair require knowledge about the use of vehicles, their parts and functions, as well as what can go wrong with them. Accordingly, The interpretation of a compound concept may be thought of as a hypothesis generated by background theories. (Murphy and Medin, 1985: 306) In the revised framework, semantic constraints embody theories: constraints describe the assignment of necessary and default properties to a concept together with relations between these properties. For example, in a theory elephant may be de ned for the property assignment constraints shown in (17) In (17), the rst constraint necessarily assigns the shape property the valuè elephant-shape'. Likewise, the second and third constraints assign default values for size and taste. The third constraint necessarily assigns a value for taste on the condition that <material value esh> is de ned for the concept. This property is de ned by a constraint in the concept animate | it necessarily assigns the value esh to the material property on the condition that <polarity value positive> is de ned | and since animate subsumes elephant, the later concept inherits the constraint. Furthermore, assignment of properties is based upon the following property assignment principle:
The Property Assignment Principle (pap) When concepts are assigned properties from two sources, one of these is a prioritized source (ps) and the other is a non-prioritized source (nps). Concepts in a subsumption relationship are prioritized: the concept with the more general type is the nps and the concept with the more speci c type is the ps. Concepts in a head modi er relationship are prioritized: the concept speci ed in the head category is the nps and the concept in the modi er category is the ps.
A property P assigned a value by a constraint in ps has priority over P assigned by a constraint in nps unless P is assigned a value by a default constraint in ps and P is assigned a value by necessary constraint in nps.
This revised approach can, in principle, account for typicality, intrinsic and sortal defeat.
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The value of the colour property pink elephants arises from an assignment`con ict' between concepts in a head modi er relationship: pink has a necessay constraint which assigns the value pink and elephant has default constraint which assigns grey. If both these constraint were to apply then the concept in the result category would be ill-de ned. With the pap, however, this situation does not arise: since colour (P ) is the assigned by a necessary constraint in the modi er (ps) and by a default constraint in the head (nps), only the former constraint applies thereby allowing the category constraint to succeed.
With the intrinsic defeat in fake elephants, the concept in the modi er category has a necessary constraint which assigns polarity the value negative and the concept in the head category has a necessary constraint which assigns the value positive. Application of pap forestalls incompatibility by only applying the constraint in the modi er category: the concept in result category has the value negative. Note also that most properties of elephant assigned by default are preserved: by default, fake elephants have the size, shape and colour of real elephants. What they lack is the value esh for material: while the constraint is inherited from animate, it cannot apply since its condition | that polarity has the value positive | is not satis ed. Since this constraint does not apply, the condition (<material value esh>) for the default constraint assigning taste the value`elephant-taste' is not applied.
While dynamic assignment of properties and the pap forestalls failure of the category constraint, sortal defeat also requires elaboration of one of combining concepts. In phrases such as the lizards worshipped, the result category has the type animate for the agent role, not the type assigned by the head or the modi er categories. This arises from elaboration of the head concept: with event head concepts, the type for the role is replaced by one which subsumes the types assigned by the modi er (lizard) and head (sentient) concepts. With the sortal defeat in chocolate elephant, it is the modi er concept which is elaborated. The concept associated with the adjective modi er chocolate has a necessary constraint which assigns material the value chocolate. The concept elephant inherits a necessary constraint from animate which assigns it the value esh. According to the pap, the modi er constraint has priority over the inherited head constraint and the concept of result category has chocolate as the value of material. As a result, the constraint on elephant which assigns a value for taste cannot apply. However, the other default constraints can: chocolate elephants are by default`elephant-shaped', large and grey. Unfortunately, this is counterintuitive: chocolate elephants are typically sweet, brown and small. This problem does not arise if the modi er concept is elaborated: with entity head concepts, the modi er concept is replaced by one which includes the property its assigns. The concept underlying chocolate can be elaboratedWith this as the modi er concept, pap ensures that properties of the result concept are assigned the appropriate values: material, taste, size and colour are assigned the values speci ed by chocolate-entity constraints, but shape is assigned by the constraint in elephant since necessary constraints of heads (nps) apply rather than default constraints of modi ers (ps).
The e ect of defeasibility on the hmp is the replacement of the category constraint de nition in (9 iv) with that given below: 3. C H :<semantics> t C H :<syntax modi er NUMBER semantics> With this category constraint, the Head Modi er Principle is able to account for these examples of defeasibility by restricting the application of constraints and, where necessary, elaborating concepts, prior to uni cation. Clearly, it will need to be generalized in order to account for other examples including those exhibiting general defeat.
Conclusion
In this chapter, we have described a uni cation-based framework whose combinatorial principle is based upon the head modi er distinction in dependency grammar. The underlying motivation for the priority of the head in phrases was a semantic ranking in which the semantic type of a head systematically outranked that of the modi er. An alternative combinatorial principle, based upon the distinction between functor and argument, was shown to require an additional principle, the Endotypic Principle, for an adequate treatment of serialization and semantic category constancy. In addition, an alleged distinctive characteristic of functors, semantic variation in interpretation, was shown to be no less applicable to argument categories. Defeasibility evidence, however, presents a challenge to this framework since in some phrases the categories have incompatible values for properties and the result category does not necessarily preserve those of the head category. This challenge was meet through an approach to semantics in which properties of a concept are assigned by theory-based constraints and the application of these constraints was partly based upon the priority of modi ers over heads. The general consequence of defeasibility for linguistic theory is that subsumption cannot be maintained as a general e ect of combination | modi ers can change heads.
